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
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
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
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**PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA**

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL ABDUL MANAP IBRAHIM

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has continuously waged a "war of national liberation" with the objective of establishing a communist state in Malaya, now known as Malaysia. China has since 1974 normalized diplomatic relations with Malaysia and other countries in Southeast Asia. However, China's foreign policy of establishing a government to government relationship with her anti-communist neighbors in Southeast Asia including Malaysia did not deter her from continuing to give her support to the communist movements in those same countries on the basis of party to party relationship. This is seen as the manifestation of her strategic objective of establishing Chinese political dominance in the Southeast Asian region. This dual track policy of China has both direct and indirect impacts on the regional and internal security of Malaysia. The internal security, in particular, covers the wide spectrum of economic, political, sociopsychological and military aspects. The question is how should Malaysia face these problems in the coming years ahead?

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PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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
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WEST MALAYSIA





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EAST MALAYSIA



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWF	Armed Work Force
BN	Barisan Nasional (National Front)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPI	Communist Party of Indonesia
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
DAP	Democratic Action Party
EPA	Economic Program of Action
GNP	Gross National Product
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MGLU	Malayan General Labour Union
MIC	Malayan Indian Congress
MNLF	Malayan National Liberation Front
MNLA	Malayan National Liberation Army
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
MPF	Malayan Patriotic Front
MPHB	Multi-Purpose Holding Berhad (Limited)
MRLA	Malayan Race Liberation Front
NCNA	New China News Agency
NCP	Nanyang Communist Party
NEP	New Economic Policy
NELU	Nanyang General Labour Union
OPP	Outline Perspective Policy
PAS	Pan Islamic Party
PBDS	Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sarawak (United Dayak Party of Sarawak)
PERNAS	Permodalan Nasional (National Trust)
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMNP	Revolutionary Malay Nationalist Party
SEDC	State Economic Development Corporation
UDA	Urban Development Authority
UMNO	United Malay National Organization
USNO	United Sabah National Organization
VMR	Voice of Malayan Revolution
VPB	Voice of People of Burma
VPT	Voice of People of Thailand
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PRC's policy towards the nations of Southeast Asia in general, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in particular, has undergone considerable changes in recent years. The history of Chinese policy towards individual Southeast Asian nations has contributed to a legacy of caution and suspicion.¹ For a generation Chinese policy in Southeast Asia has been to promote dissension in order to preserve its influence in the region. China's active support in the past for communist insurgency movements in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines has not been forgotten by Southeast Asia's leaders. In Indonesia, suspicions still linger that China was behind the violent, abortive coup attempt in 1965. China's credibility is weakened by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) continued relations with illegal communist parties in the ASEAN countries, its offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea and its interest in the large influential overseas Chinese communities in each of the ASEAN countries.²

BACKGROUND

The Federation of Malaya achieved its independence from Britain on 31 August 1957, following a long counterinsurgency war against the insurgent forces of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The Malayan Emergency, as it is commonly known, was waged by British led forces from 1948 until 1957. The CPM, a Maoist movement composed almost exclusively of ethnic overseas Chinese, still retains elements of its forces in the sanctuaries along the Thai-Malaysian border. Although the CPM no longer poses a serious challenge to the

Malaysian government, its potential appeal to the ethnic Chinese, who comprise approximately 32 percent of Malaysia's population, underscores the longstanding fears Malaysians have held for the possibility of racial discord within their society.³ Periodically, these tensions have risen to the surface in the form of violent and destabilizing racial riots between the Malay and the Chinese citizens.

Malaysia's security interests are primarily internal in nature. Operations by government security forces against the remnants of the CPM, with cooperation from Thailand, still continue along the Thai-Malaysian border. China's support for the CPM has apparently waned in recent years, motivated by China's overriding concern for the intrusion of Soviet influence in Indochina. Nevertheless, Malaysia views China as posing the most serious long-term threat to its security interests. There are no "overseas Soviets" in Malaysia to render party-to-party support for a dormant but dangerously latent Maoist communist party.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The changing policies of PRC in the post-Mao era of modernization have had a profound influence on the course and extent of the pro-Chinese communist struggle in Southeast Asia and in Malaysia in the context of her global and regional foreign policy and her support for the war of national liberation. This influence has brought about new changes and approach in the CPM's efforts to gain inroads. Their approach, the formation of a new democratic coalition government is in concert with PRC's design to oppose "Soviet hegemonism" in the region through its policy of "peaceful coexistence." This has far-reaching implications to the security of Malaysia.

AIM

The purpose of this study is to examine PRC's foreign policy towards Southeast Asian states in the context of her global and regional interests and her historical expansionist design of extending her southern border and to analyze how these are related to her involvement in the development of the CPM in the latter's effort to overthrow the legitimate government of Malaysia through armed struggle.

The study will also look into the effects these have on the security of Malaysia in the sociopolitical, economic and insurgency fields with a view to propose certain countermeasures.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The study will commence with a short survey of the PRC's relations with the Southeast Asian countries in general and with Malaysia in particular during the post-cultural revolution. It then proceeds to trace the historical development of the CPM from 1926 until its present day and CPM's role in the PRC's global and regional strategy. The study will analyze the effects of these on the security of Malaysia and concludes with proposed countermeasures.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

The study was dependent upon a wide variety of historical texts, public documents, periodicals and newspaper articles, as well as published and unpublished papers for the information necessary to address the subject. This paper will address the foreign policy of PRC in relation to the nations of Southeast Asia as a region, in particular those in ASEAN, and will not address them as individual countries. However, where appropriate individual

peculiarities will be highlighted. The study will finally address the effects of PRC's policy on the security of Malaysia. While some of the conclusions derived from the analysis are drawn from the thoughts of regional specialists, many of them are dependent on the author's subjective evaluation of available evidence and his personal knowledge and experience of the affairs of the countries in the region and those of his own country. This knowledge of the communist movement in Malaysia including the various strategies adopted by the CPM in the past as well as in the present are based on his experience as a member of the Malaysian Army which has been fighting an insurgency war for the last 40 years.

ENDNOTES

1. Joseph Camilleri, "Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy," Occasional Paper No. 29, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, 30 April 1975, pp. 20-21.

2. Southeast Asia's overseas Chinese population was recently estimated to be approximately 18 million. R. Toba, "ASEAN Development Strategy and Japanese Cooperation," Asia Pacific Community, No. 24, Spring 1984, p. 81.

3. Malaysia's ethnic composition comprise of 58.6 percent Malays and other indigenous races (Bumiputera), 32.1 percent Chinese, 8.6 percent Indians and 0.7 percent others. Information Malaysia 1987 Yearbook, p. 39.

CHAPTER II

PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING MALAYSIA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

China's interest and involvement in the affairs of Southeast Asia dates back almost two thousand years. Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago had evolved a tributary relationship with the Chinese empire based on trade and the acceptance of Chinese suzerainty.¹ China protected Siam against the Indochinese states and also invaded Vietnam in the 15th century.² The Chinese Emperor gave the Kingdom of Malacca protection against Siam in the 1400s in return for tribute twice yearly.³ Since the communist Chinese victory of 1949 relationship between PRC and the nations of Southeast Asia, except for the Indo-Chinese states and Indonesia (before 1965), was nonexistent. But contacts between the communist parties in the region and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been maintained since 1920.

After the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969 China's foreign policy was shaped on the development of her vital interests in world affairs on one hand and the spreading of Maoist communist ideology and world revolution on the other. Her vital interests in international affairs focus on three major points: firstly, to obtain and consolidate control over regions that traditionally have been subject to Chinese rule; secondly, to develop an independent and strong position in world affairs as a communist power; and thirdly, to develop her wealth and power to the point where China will be able to retain her historically influential position in East Asian politics.⁴

In pursuing these objectives China considers that the ultimate achievement that will guarantee her strong influence in this region is the adoption of the

Maoist communist ideology by the governments of the Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand the establishment of a pro-Soviet communist party such as existing in the Republic of Vietnam is unacceptable to the Chinese interest.

As China emerged from its self-imposed diplomatic isolation after the Cultural Revolution and as the situation in Southeast Asia became more uncertain in the context of the proposed U.S. withdrawal from the area under the Nixon Doctrine, China began to make an effort to cultivate better relations with its neighbors in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. However, these countries were alienated from China because of its "revolutionary policy" towards the Asian countries. But by 1970 Beijing had "adopted for a long-term, gradual political and economic strategy designed to reassure those neighboring states which are suspicious of Chinese intentions."⁵

China's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors began to change profoundly as Sino-American relations began to normalize after the 1972 Peking Summit. Just as the Sino-Japanese relationship was established soon after the summit, China's diplomatic relations with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were established by 1974-1975. Burma has had diplomatic ties with Beijing since the 1950s. China's diplomatic relationship with Indonesia has been suspended since 1967, and Singapore, the other member of ASEAN, has not wanted to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing before the Indonesians resume theirs.⁶ These diplomatic successes also enabled China to maintain strong ties with the pro-Beijing communist parties in those countries.

The opening of diplomatic relations between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors did not put an end to Beijing's support for the communist insurgency movements in the region. Attacks on the Malaysian government by a radio station calling itself the Voice of Malayan Revolution (VMR), based in the

South China Sea, continued unabated.⁷ The existence of the Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT), like the Voice of the People of Burma (VPB) and the VMR underlines the contrast between China's apparent efforts to improve its relations with anti-communist countries in Southeast Asia and its commitment to support communist insurgent movements in the very same countries in the region.⁸

PRC's dual policy was apparent in Premier Chou En Lai's speech during the visit of Malaysia's Prime Minister to China on 28 May 1974. The Chinese leader, in his speech, stated that the Chinese people consistently support the struggles of the "oppressed people" as part of her international duty. At the same time relations with those countries can be developed on the basis of five principles of peaceful coexistence--mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and peaceful coexistence.⁷ China's foreign policy of establishing government to government relationships with her anti-communist neighbors does not preclude her from continuing her support to the communist movements in those same countries on the basis of party to party relationships. The latter is seen as an extension of the foreign policy to achieve the long term objectives of establishing communist political dominance in the region.⁹

THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The five principles of peaceful coexistence postulated by the Chinese are very appealing and comforting to her neighbors at first glance. However, a closer look at them reveal certain inconsistencies.¹⁰ First, on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, PRC's track record has not shown that they have abided by this principle. Their

occupation of the Paracel Islands and their intimidating claim to the Spratly Islands are in contradiction of this very principle. China's military invasion of the northern border of Vietnam between 17 February 1979 to 5 March 1979 to "teach a lesson" to Vietnam was another case in point.

Second, on the principle of mutual nonaggression this is applied when it suits the Chinese. After her encroachment into Tibet, beginning in 1950, the PRC is yet to invade any of her other neighbors to impose a communist regime. Her preference to impose such a regime through the proxy of the pro-Beijing Maoist parties within those countries is abundantly clear. However, even this very principle was violated by her short-lived invasion of Vietnam in early 1979 on the excuse of Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

Third, the noninterference in each other's internal affairs is the biggest farce of all. Her policy of government to government relationship being separate from the party to party relationship between CCP and the pro-Beijing parties in the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia questions the validity of this principle.

Fourth, the principle of equality and mutual benefits covers a wide range of activities for trade, industries and military. Her pursuit in the economic development of China is in line with her Four Modernizations program (industrial, agricultural, military and scientific) to transform a backward country into a modern industrial power by the year 2000. This necessitates her to establish trade and economic cooperation with the advanced countries like the United States, Europe and Japan for her technological advancement and the countries of the Third World for the source of raw materials for her growing industries. In addition, the countries of the Third World, especially those which have a large population of overseas Chinese provide ready markets for her cheap manufactured goods as a source of foreign exchange.

Fifth, China puts a lot of efforts to espouse and propagate her principle of peaceful coexistence. Her support for ASEAN and its concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) is the manifestation of such a principle. However, underlining this support for ASEAN is her incessant policy of curbing Soviet influence and hegemonism in the region. Her relationship with Thailand is on the government to government basis; indeed Thailand regards PRC as her ally in the face of the Vietnamese threat. The party to party relationships between CCP and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is in concert with the principle of peaceful existence. Thailand launched a widely publicized amnesty campaign for CPT in 1980-1982. After only about 2,000 members of CPT had laid down their arms to the government of Thailand, the 13,500 strong CPT was declared ineffective. The headquarters of the CPT was allowed to move from the Northeastern province to Tak Province, to be closer to the Burmese Communist Party. In the Thai/Malaysian border, the Thai authorities stopped any combined operations on the Thai territories against the pro-Beijing CPM since 1980. The Southeast Asian governments remain concerned about Beijing's influence among the large overseas Chinese communities. China reverted to the pre-Cultural Revolution policy of abandoning its traditional claims to the allegiance of the Chinese abroad and encouraging them to become citizens of the states in which they live--at the same time, China gives them special treatment when they visit the mother country.¹¹

ENDNOTES

1. Joseph Camilleri, "Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy," Occasional Paper No. 29, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, 30 April 1975, p. 1.

2. T. J. Brack, Mod London, "China's Foreign Policy Towards her South Asian and ASEAN Neighbors."

3. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977, p. 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Golam W. Choudhury, China in World Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the PRC since 1970, p. 235.

6. Ibid., p. 239.

7. Ibid., p. 240.

8. Ibid., p. 238.

9. Sutter, p. 119.

10. Camilleri, p. 6.

11. Choudhury, p. 239.

CHAPTER III

PRC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CPM 1920-1987

GENERAL

This chapter will briefly trace the development of the Communist Party of Malaya since the communist ideology sowed its seeds in the country in the early 1920's until the present day and the role played by PRC in the former's development. From a humble beginning in the form of a labor union in 1926, the Communist Party of Malaya has grown in stature to an organization bent in overthrowing the legitimate government of Malaysia in order to establish a communist state. Its historical development covers five significant periods of both growth and setbacks: first, the early years of its formation up to the end of the Second World War (1920-1945) when it made its first attempt to establish a communist government; second, the period of post-World War Two until the end of the Malayan Emergency (1945-1959) when it met its second failure to achieve its objective; third, the period of resuscitation (1960-1968) when it withdrew to the Malaysia-Thai border to rebuild its strength after its disastrous defeat; fourth, the period of new struggle (1969-1979) when it ventured to reestablish itself in the armed struggle and finally, the era of the CPM's Directive of 1980 (1980 to date) when it continues to wage its struggle through both the political and military efforts to bring down the government for its final takeover.

CPM UP TO SECOND WORLD WAR (1920-1945)

As far back as history could recall China has always considered Southeast Asia as far south as the Malay Peninsula as within her sphere of influence, if not as part of her lost territories. After years of internal strife in the

20s, 30s and 40s the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse Tung finally gained victory in 1949. After the Second World War China considered the Southeast Asian states as good breeding grounds for pro-Peking Chinese communist revolutionary ideology.¹ China took upon herself to lead and assist the smaller colonial states in Southeast Asia in forming communist liberation movements to carry out both political and armed struggle in order to establish communist governments.

Communism in Malaya did not take its root from the grievances of her peasantry or working class, nor was it from the desire of the indigenous population for independence under British rule. Communism was an ideology brought into a small section of the Chinese community in Malaya by the agents of CCP in the early 20's. At around 1926 the CCP infiltrated its agents into Singapore and Malaya spreading their teaching among the labor organizations and associations. In the same year the first communist organization was formed in Singapore known as the Nanyang General Labour Union (NGLU).² In 1927 the CCP sent in five representatives to Malaya to set up a new organization called the Nanyang Communist Party (NCP). At the Third Representatives' Conference held in Singapore in 1930, the NCP and the NGLU were reorganized and were superceded by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan General Labour Union (MGLU). The MCP was also to cover activities in Thailand.³

During the period of Japanese occupation of Malaya 1941-1945 the CCP instructed the MCP to offer resistance activities to the British against the Japanese.⁴ With an initial intake of 200 Chinese the resistance movement known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) grew into a force of 4,000. They were trained, armed and organized into seven regiments by the British by 1943. Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the MPAJA

attempted to take over Malaya before the arrival of the British. This was strongly resisted by the indigenous Malays in two weeks of bloody fighting which prevented the intended communist takeover. In December 1945 the British disbanded the MPAJA. However, a secret section of about 4,000 communist members remained underground with about 2,000 British weapons. This marked the beginning of the communist armed struggle under the new name of the Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA) directly under the guidance of the CCP.⁵

POST WORLD WAR II UNTIL THE END OF EMERGENCY (1945-1959)

The British military superiority over that of the MRLA forced the MCP to embark on a campaign of subversion. It organized a united front among the Chinese population and some of the Malay nationalists who were in opposition to the British colonial rule. Encouraged by the international communist movement and the Asian communist parties in 1947 toward militancy the new Secretary General of MCP, Chin Pang reportedly travelled to China to seek assistance and direction from CCP. As a result of the MCP's poor performance in the united front efforts and swayed by Mao's military successes in China, the MCP in June 1948 began its armed struggle in Malaya.⁶ The MRLA later known as the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) embarked on a campaign of widespread terrorism and assassination of government and European officials that led to the British proclamation of the state of emergency on 12 July 1948 throughout Malaya. The MCP's program was based on the Maoist model.⁷

The British colonial government's countermeasures scored telling successes both in the armed and the united front struggle and MCP suffered heavy losses in manpower and influence. The PRC in 1951 lodged protest of alleged British persecution of overseas Chinese in Malaya. It even demanded a delegation from Peking to inspect the Chinese condition in Malaya.⁸ The

MCP drew up another directive known as "October 5" Directive which stressed the need to establish an anti-British national united front among all classes of the people of Malaya. The armed campaign was to be directed towards military and paramilitary targets. Bases in deep jungle were established and subversive activities through the communist united front in towns were vigorously pursued. However, these efforts were successfully opposed by the British.

Pressed by the CCP to change its strategy instead towards gaining recognition for the party through negotiation, the MCP offered to end the fighting with the new Alliance Government of Malaya in November 1955 in exchange for recognition of the MCP as a legal party. The Chief Minister of the Alliance government Tengku Abdul Rahman met the Secretary General of MCP Chin Peng in December 1955. Tengku Abdul Rahman rejected the request to legalize MCP and instead urged the MCP to surrender on the basis of the government's earlier offer of amnesty. Chin Peng chose to return to the jungle.⁹

In August 1957 the British declared the independence of the Federation of Malaya. The MCP did not recognize the independence, but instead issued a Five-Point Manifesto as justification for it to continue the struggle. By 1960 the MCP had been placed in an untenable position in the insurgency war. Over the period of 12 years of its struggle for power the MCP suffered heavy losses totalling 13,409 men (6,710 killed, 2,810 wounded, 1,287 captured and 2,702 surrendered) against the government total loss of 4,425 (2,947 police personnel and 1,478 military personnel).¹⁰ The MCP changed its name to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and retreated to the Thai/Malayan border. The relatively close relationship between CCP and MCP provided the latter with direction on important policy issues. The strong ideological influence of the

CCP upon MCP grew during the years of Malayan Emergency. MCP played down their ties with China for good reasons. While the MCP was undeniably an ethnic-Chinese organization and while its principal political weapon was Chinese chauvinism, it continued to assume a multiracial complexion and to rebut charges that it was an instrument of communist China. The lack of success on the part of MCP was the inability of the communists to undermine the nationalist prestige of the noncommunist leaders of Malaya and to make credible the threat of western imperialism. The CPM's "peace" approach was an expressed interpretation of Peking's policy of peaceful coexistence.

THE PERIOD OF RESUSCITATION (1960-1968)

The Malayan Emergency, for all intents and purposes, ended in 1960. The CPM's strategic retreat to safe sanctuary in the southern border of Thailand was to regroup and lick its wounds. Its strength was reduced to less than 1,000 men. Its activities were concentrated on recruitment and infiltration into various political parties, trade unions, farmers' associations, cultural and student bodies throughout Malaya and Singapore. During the "Indonesian Confrontation" of 1963-1965 CPM showed support toward the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI). China was instrumental in getting such support from CPM in exchange for Peking's pledge to provide support for CPM's struggle.¹¹

Since the late fifties Peking, through the New China News Agency (NCNA), had urged the communist parties in Southeast Asia to intensify their armed struggle. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) set the pace for the CPM to embark on a more aggressive posture. The CPM issued a new directive known as the "June 68 Directive" which gave direction for the formation of guerrilla bases in Peninsular Malaysia to intensify the revolutionary war. By that time the CPM's strength had increased to more than 2,000. This marked the

beginning of an undeclared "Second Emergency" in Malaya. In late 1969 a clandestine radio which called itself the Voice of Malayan Revolution (VMR) began beaming out its broadcast from the southern part of China. The VMR continuously issued CCP's policy guidance in between its propaganda transmissions.

THE NEW STRUGGLE 1969-1979

In response to the call of the CCP the CPM began to infiltrate their now well-trained cadres into the heartland of Peninsular Malaysia. The communist "armed work force" (AWF) and "assault units" sprang up in their old and traditional areas of operation in the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia. They expanded these organizations despite constant setbacks from security forces action. In the meantime the CPM gained control of the local Chinese population and local authorities in Southern Thailand. The local farmers were levied taxes and recruitment from local Thai Chinese and some Thai Muslims was intensified and these formed the logistic support for the armed struggle in Peninsular Malaysia.

From an initial number of less than a 100 in 1969 the CPM expanded to 300 armed guerrillas in 1973. They operated in small groups selecting the rural Chinese farmers and aborigines as their main targets. These became the source of information for their operations and logistic support against security forces. These support bases known as the "Min Yuen" grew to some 40,000 throughout the country during the height of the Emergency.¹²

The guerrillas succeeded in developing similar bases among the inland aborigines by living together with them and getting involved in their daily needs in the manner of hunting, cultivating foodstuff and providing them with small amounts of medical aid. The aborigines opened up more areas for

cultivation and this became the guerrillas' source of supply in the jungle. Security forces operations only managed to curb the activities of the communist militant activities. The security forces eliminated some 250 and a total of 388 communist insurgents surrendered since 1969. Despite this, the number of insurgents grew by avoiding engagements with the security forces.

THE ERA OF THE CPM'S DIRECTIVE 1980 TO DATE

At the 50th anniversary of the CPM, which fell on 30 April 1980, the CPM issued a new directive known as the "1980 Directive." It calls for the establishment of a broad-based new democratic united front comprising not only the traditional proletariats like the workers and peasants but also all strata of society such as the national patriots of the country who are the enemies of communism. The objective is to wage a new democratic revolution to form the Democratic Republic of Malaya. The 1980 Directive covers a 10-point program calling for:¹³ first, development of a new democratic united front consisting of all strata of the society; second, struggle against Soviet hegemonism; third, oppose the New Economic Policy of the government; fourth, win over/weaken the security forces; fifth, expand the people's army; sixth, adopt the five principles of peaceful coexistence with other countries; finally, the rest of the program covers land reform, anti-corruption, release of political detainees, development of patriotic culture and respect for all religions.

Let us examine the major points of the CPM's new directive:

Development of New Democratic United Front

This is an attempt by the CPM to modify the old and unappealing concept of peasant-workers united front. In this new concept of the "New Democratic United Front" the CPM hopes to attract not only the peasant and workers but

also government officials, members of the public and private sector, intellectuals, politicians and the nationalist patriots of all ethnic groups in the country. To get inroads into the Malay community for which the communist movement has the least appeal, the Revolutionary Malay Nationalist Party (RMNP) was formed as part of the United Front to attract Malay members. The existing united front organizations such as the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF) and others remain to form the main components of the New Democratic United Front. Initially party branches consisting of a small cell of three and four members are to be established in all existing bodies--political parties, factories, schools, social bodies, business communities, security organizations, etc., to carry out covert propaganda and subversive activities in line with the CPM's policy. These cells will be expanded to get more members. Ex-party members are to be encouraged to rejoin the CPM and those who have not committed anything against the CPM will be allowed to retain their previous seniority.

The manifesto listed a 12-point program to attract Malays into the party. Amongst the more important issues are the unity of Malays, develop patriotism among Muslims and struggle against Soviet hegemonism. The CPM targets are Malay political leaders, intellectuals and students.

Struggle Against Soviet Hegemonism

This echoes the CCP's policy of opposing Soviet hegemonism. It calls for spreading overt and covert propaganda against the Soviet Union. CPM hopes to influence the Malaysian society through members of the New Democratic United Fronts whose members will eventually permeate every strata of the society to be anti-Soviet. The anti-Soviet attitude, it is hoped, will lead Malaysia to more accommodating relations with China.

Oppose the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the Government

The government NEP's objective is to eradicate poverty and to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. If the NEP is successful the CPM's goal of getting the support of the people will not be achieved. It is the intention of the CPM to ensure that the NEP will not work by spreading propaganda to create apprehension and frustration among the various races of the country.

Win Over/Weaken Security Forces Personnel

The CPM is fully aware that the security forces personnel will be the stumbling block in their struggle to usurp political power. This program calls for all members of CPM to try to win over security forces personnel through coercion and subversion of frustrated personnel, bribery and blackmail. The loyalty of the security forces towards the government is to be undermined through the spreading of rumors and propaganda.

Expansion of the People's Army

CPM wants its militant units to operate in small groups and to win over the people by providing assistance to them in their daily activities. The assistance can be in the form of medical treatment such as acupuncture treatment, and any other assistance deemed fit for the rural people who live in deep and isolated villages. Once the confidence and support of these villagers have been won over, the CPM will form village "Min Yuen." The CPM aspires to reach the total of about 40,000 supporters as it had done during the "Malayan Emergency" period. With this number as a base it would make way for the expansion of the People's Army.

Adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

This is in fact an extension of PRC's foreign policy stated in Chapter II. In the context of the CPM, the party must coexist with the ruling government by infiltrating existing government agencies, public and private sectors, political parties, cultural and other societies. These bodies are to be clinically subverted until they are taken over by members of the CPM. Thus the government will be influenced to adopt a more acceptable relation with China, thus enhancing the party to party relationship. This environment of good government to government and party to party relations is prevailing in Thailand today vis-a-vis the relationship between PRC and Thailand and that of CCP and CPT. This will enable PRC to exert her influence in Thailand and similarly in Malaysia and the whole region of Southeast Asia.

From the above, nations of Southeast Asia such as Malaysia and Thailand can be intimidated through the government to government relationship due to PRC military and nuclear might. This can bring about the rise in Chinese chauvinism and motivate the younger generation of overseas Chinese to convert their sense of pride in the motherland. It is through this dynamism that PRC hopes to disseminate the Maoist ideology. This in turn will bring about new changes in the internal stability of the countries where large Chinese populations exist. The erosion of political stability will eventually cause the collapse of the ruling government thus giving way to communist takeover.

ENDNOTES

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3. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, Second Edition 1976, p. 252.

4. Coates, pp. 5-9.
5. Taylor, p. 255.
6. Ibid., p. 257.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 262.
9. Ibid., p. 278.
10. Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya, The Communist Insurgency War, 1948-1960, p. 177.
11. Taylor, p. 303.
12. O'Ballance, p. 92.
13. Malaysian Army Report on CPM.

CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA

GENERAL

Southeast Asia is of importance to the PRC for reasons of geography, economics, history and security. PRC's major policy in this region is to develop strong ties with the non-communist states. Initially, the formation of ASEAN was severely criticized by PRC. To Beijing, ASEAN was a military alliance set up by United States reactionaries. However, there is a current change in its attitude towards ASEAN as it endeavors to prevent any further growth of Soviet influence and Vietnamese expansionist policy in Southeast Asia and in particular the ASEAN states.

The close and cordial Sino-Vietnamese relationship of the 1960s and early 1970s has been replaced by close Chinese cooperation with ASEAN. Malaysia established diplomatic relations in 1974, followed by the Philippines in 1975. PRC's special relation with Thailand can be explained in the context of PRC's direct involvement in Kampuchea. However, PRC has yet to have diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore, even though it does not prevent them from maintaining direct trade relations. The sixth ASEAN member, Brunei has yet to establish relations with the PRC.

PRC's relations with the ASEAN states has improved in recent years despite unresolved problems. Overseas Chinese populations are treated with suspicion in most of the ASEAN states. The major irritant in the PRC's relations with ASEAN is the lingering Chinese policy with regional communist movements in Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia.

About 18 million overseas Chinese live in Southeast Asia as a result of immigration over the centuries. There is a change in the Chinese government

policy with regards to the status of the overseas Chinese. In the effort to improve relations with Southeast Asia, PRC has appealed to the overseas Chinese to show allegiance to their countries of residence.

TERRITORIAL CLAIM

It is envisaged that a resurgence of a strong PRC is likely to assert geographical influence in the South China Sea region. This is likely as PRC had in the past enforced her influence and authority over this region through her tributary system. PRC's claim involves 160 islands around the Malaysian coast of Sabah and Sarawak. China's aggressive attitude has been demonstrated in its invasion and occupation of the Paracel Islands from the Vietnamese. This aggressive posture could well be repeated in the near future, where it involves the national interest and national security, PRC would take necessary actions including diplomatic and possibly military forms. However, her naval capability is restricted at this moment because she does not have the capability of sustaining operations beyond her borders. Territorial claims could be a source of conflict which ultimately may involve PRC. Should this situation develop, then it may jeopardize Malaysia's security.

THE LINK WITH LOCAL COMMUNISTS

Communist insurgency in Malaysia serves as an immediate threat to internal security and stability of Malaysia. Even though Malaysia has established formal diplomatic relations with China since 31 July 1974, Malaysia cannot conceal the perennial problem of PRC's support for the communist insurgency.

This has been a thorny issue in the context of Sino-Malaysia relations. PRC maintained that it is not the government of PRC that recognizes the CPM, but it is party to party link. It is in this respect that CPM could become a serious threat to the security of Malaysia. China is expected to continue maintaining the party to party link with CPM and there is every possibility that the CPM may make inroads in the pursuit of their new policy directive which, as stated earlier, is in line with CCP's policy.

THE MALAYSIAN CHINESE

Currently the population of ethnic Chinese in Peninsular Malaysia stands at 4.5 million which forms 35 percent of the Peninsula's population. In addition there are some 650,000 Chinese in the eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak. The Chinese make up about 32 percent of the 16 million population. Although the Chinese are the minority they dominate the economy of the country. PRC pays special attention to the overseas Chinese because they form an important source of income of foreign exchange to the PRC. PRC has distinct preference for Chinese businessmen as opposed to indigenous businessmen in awarding contracts for Chinese goods. This issue may jeopardize the security of Malaysia, as it could develop into tension which of later may explode into racial clashes.

POLITICAL STABILITY

Communalism has always been the mainstay of Malaysian political history. Political parties were not only created to cater for specific ethnic groups but are currently thriving on racial issues in pursuing their objectives and interests. The main political parties such as the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), Malayan Indian

Congress (MIC), Pan Islamic Party (PAS) all in Peninsular Malaysia, the United Dayak Party of Sarawak (PBDS) in Sarawak and the United Sabah National Organization (USNO) in Sabah are all based on particular ethnic groups. Even the so-called multiethnic parties are not spared from racial identification e.g., the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is predominantly Chinese, while Berjaya Party in Sabah is predominantly Malay in character. As communal issues are being agitated, racial tension will certainly heighten and will result in further racial polarization.

Despite being multiracial in nature, the ruling coalition government of the National Front (BN) has not been free from interparty squabbles. Each component of BN, in particular UMNO, MCA and MIC have been championing the causes of the Malays, Chinese and Indians respectively. Of late leaders of component parties of the BN have publicly criticized each other. Though a compromise was reached, the ensuing debate and criticisms have not only created tension between leaders of political parties but have further increased racial polarization.

The New Democratic United Front of CPM will likely exploit this situation by fanning the fires of racial extremism and promoting Chinese chauvinism in all Chinese based political parties, associations and communists. Through subversive propaganda and agitation by members of the CPM who have infiltrated the existing political parties and associations, these political parties and association may likely be swayed towards extremism, especially where the old guards are replaced by the younger generation who are subjected to the propaganda of the New Democratic United Front. This may bring about political instability and racial clashes.

The present leadership struggles within UMNO has threatened to split the party. The introduction of the RMNP is at a critical phase during the split up of Malay political parties. Dissident factors amongst some Malay-based political parties are all out to harness support and in such an environment the communist will exploit the situation. The RMNP's revolutionary propaganda themes may be acceptable to the Malay dissident factors and they may be instigated by the RMNP to resort to violence. This can invite stern government reactions and push the dissident Malays into the hands of the communist. In the long term the RMNP hopes to cause splits among the Malay leaders and society thus causing political instability and undermining the nation's security. The Malays, which form the bulwark against the expansion of communist struggle will be so divided that the communist may be able at last to infiltrate into their midst. CPM's long term objective is to exploit both political and racial instability so that present coalition concept of government will collapse and that the concept of the unity of all races under the one party system of communism will be the better alternative.

ECONOMIC STABILITY

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated in 1970 as a result of the racial riot of 13 May 1969. Spreading over a period of 20 years (1971-1990), the NEP's overriding aim is national unity through a two-pronged approach-- eradication of poverty and the restructuring of society to correct the economic imbalances.

Under the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) it was envisaged that there could be substantial reduction in the overall incidence of poverty in Peninsular Malaysia from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 16.7 percent in 1990. According to the Fourth Malaysia Plan's report the poverty incidence in 1984

is down to 18.4 percent. The target of 16.7 percent by 1990 on current trend appears to be attainable if the present economic situation improves. However, it is in the agricultural sector that the incidence of poverty reflects a high rate e.g., rice growers from 80.3 percent in 1976 to 57.7 percent in 1984, rubber small holders from 58.2 percent in 1976 to 43.4 percent in 1984. As the rural dwellers are Malays the above statistics indicate that the poverty rate among them is still high. It is noted that there is a growing disparity between the rural and the urban dwellers.¹

The Chinese and the other nonindigenous races are not happy with the government's perception of poverty and the concept used to gauge the poverty line. With the present state of economic downturn the poverty problems and the disparity between the rural and the urban dwellers are expected to become worse. This issue has been exploited by the communist through its propaganda via the Voice of Malayan Revolution. This is likely to be intensified by the CPM through the RMNP which will continuously bring up these issues against the government's effort to solve it through dialogues between the political leaders. These grievances and points of contention between the various races will not be allowed to settle down, which may lead to widespread dissension and chaos. The mounting pressure on the government may cause it to disintegrate or at least to take stern actions. This will create political instability and in the ensuing security situation the security forces would be tied down to public order duties, thus releasing the pressure from the militant insurgents and giving more room and opportunity for the so-called Malayan People's Army to expand.

The second prong of the NEP is aimed at restructuring the society so that the present identification of race with particular forms of economic activity will eventually be eliminated. It is also to ensure the indigenous races'

participation in ownership and control of corporate wealth of the country. Over a 20-year period, it was planned by 1990 that the indigenous races should own and control 30 percent shares of the nation's capital, the nonindigenous races' share to increase to 40 percent and foreign shares reduced to 30 percent. After 15 years of its implementation, the equity ownership for the indigenous has reached 22 percent while the nonindigenous owned 56.7 percent. However, much of the indigenous equity holding is held by statutory bodies such as National Trust (PERNAS), Urban Development Authority (UDA), and State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) as most of the individual indigenous population are not financially able to take up their shares in the corporate sectors. The setting of the National Share thrust is one of the major initiatives by the government in providing opportunities for the indigenous to achieve the overall target.²

The nonindigenous races have established their own corporations through the MCA and MIC such as the Multi Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPHB) for the Chinese. The economic recession has slowed down the overall development and the growth rate of GNP. The NEP target of 30 percent equity for the indigenous section is unlikely to be achieved. There has been a call by the indigenous section of the population to extend the NEP beyond 1990 so that the target can be attained. This has caused concern to the nonindigenous section. Whatever the decision taken by the government beyond 1990 will not be a popular one because the indigenous and the nonindigenous have opposing vested interests in the matter. The decision will definitely have social, economic, political and security implications. The CPM is fully aware of this and will resort to a campaign of propaganda and rumors to inflame the situation. The communist policy of promoting dissension will be fully executed in order to spread its influence and finally cause the government to collapse.

NATIONAL UNITY

The national policy towards nation building calls for one language, one culture and one nation. Towards this end the education policy has been to promote the national language as the official language, whilst allowing the other vernacular languages to be used. While the Chinese see the national language policy as threatening their culture, the Malays, on the other hand, are baffled by the Chinese desire to cling to Mandarin education. Some Malays point to the Chinese community's comparative privileged position, whilst in neighboring Thailand and Indonesia the Chinese are required to speak the national language of the country, adopt indigenous names and, in the case of Indonesia, are not even allowed to have their own chambers of commerce, guilds or Chinese language books. Furthermore, the government has been concerned with the vernacular schools operating independently thus causing racial polarization among the young. In the past these schools have been known to be the breeding ground for communism. To check such racial polarization and in the interest of national unity the government, in relation to Section 21/2 of the Education Act of 1961 which has not been implemented so far, decided to do so now. This section empowers the Education Minister to convert vernacular primary schools to national schools. The Chinese and the Indians see this as an infringement on their right to study their mother tongue. The other issue is the government imposition of quota by racial breakdowns in the local institutions of higher learning. This has resulted in more qualified nonindigenous students to be left out of local universities, thus causing dissension among the nonindigenous. This issue is one of the most sensitive social issues that the communist have been able to exploit and are likely to continue to do so in the future.

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

The current wave of Islamic resurgence has attracted mainly Malays in the urban areas, students and middle class professionals. This movement comprises several independent groups. The government views the growth as a threat to its authority, especially in their criticism of policies of accommodation with other races. The government fears the penetration of the movement by left wing elements intent on spreading dissension in the Malay-Muslim community. Non-Malays have become apprehensive of this religious extremism. This provides a good breeding ground for the communist to spread its wings. Hence CPM has indicated its interest in the 1980 Directive to exploit the situation for its own interest and end.

DRUG ABUSE

The drug problem is reaching a level of concern to the government. It has afflicted mostly indigenous youth. It has even crept up to serving members of the Security Forces. The existing Dangerous Drug Act 1952 and the mandatory death sentence for those caught in drug trafficking has not been as effective as the government would like it to be. There has been evidence that CPM is involved in drug trafficking as a source of their funds and also to weaken the security forces. It is likely that the CPM will increase the tempo of its activities in the drug involvement in line with its 1980 Directive.

OTHER SOCIAL ISSUES

The communist is likely to play on other social issues that are being faced by the government. These include unemployment, economic slowdown, falling commodity prices (rubber, tin, palm oil, paper and cocoa), squatter

problems and increase in crime rate. The Voice of Malayan Revolution is likely to harp on this to cause despondency and frustration to the people. The CPM is likely to spread its propaganda and play on the emotions of the people through the New Democratic United Front to bring out dissatisfaction and rise against the present government. Through these efforts the CPM hopes to achieve its objective of bringing down the government and form the communist state of the Democratic Republic of Malaya.

"THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"

The new strategy of the CPM is a very clearly designed ways and means for the party to achieve its objective of overthrowing the government of Malaysia in the long term. It hopes to achieve this by creating sociopolitical instability in the country through subversion and propaganda using its cadres who infiltrate the existing political, public and private agencies, social and cultural bodies at every strata. From small groups of two or three the CPM hopes to expand its membership and influence within these established bodies and develop the New Democratic United Front into an effective tool to create dissension against the established order. Using all the political, economic and social issues discussed earlier the CPM hopes to rally support from all nonindigenous people to bring about political instability and public disorder. Through the newly revived Revolutionary Malay National Party the CPM hopes to attract dissident and radical Malay leaders, both in the ruling political parties and in the opposition, who are opposed to the present National Front government. The CPM would use issues attractive to the Malays such as Malay unity, patriotism amongst Muslims, land reforms, Malay language and the struggle against Soviet imperialism. The CPM eventually hope to bring all patriotic, nationalistic and religious Malays to unite together with the

Socialists (communists) in a common struggle against "reactionaries" and "imperialists". Once popular support from the Chinese and Malays are obtained the movement against the ruling government can easily be orchestrated with a good chance of success.

In the meantime at the militant front, the CPM's main aim is to show their presence especially in the traditional area of influence, cultivate the rural people to form "Min Yuen" cells. Potential recruits in the villages are given indoctrination of the Maoist ideology. Once they have been won over they are given military training until they are given areas when the time comes. Once the cell is fully established the communist insurgents expand into new areas to develop a very strong revolutionary base. Once a sizable force has been built the Malayan People's Army would again bring its armed insurrection into full swing. The combination of war waged at both the political and militant front, it is hoped by the communists, will eventually cause the downfall of the government and the setting up of the communist government of the "Democratic Government of Malaysia."

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER V
PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES

REGIONAL SECURITY

Like all other ASEAN states, Malaysia cannot hope to stand up against the military might of PRC or the Soviet Union. Its future, like that of other ASEAN states, is best served by continuing to ally its economic interests with the free world and its external security interests with the United States. The United States is the only nation capable of providing an effective deterrence against outside aggression directed toward ASEAN countries including Malaysia. Realizing that the United States is unlikely to involve itself directly in counterinsurgency war in Southeast Asia after its unhappy experience in South Vietnam it is imperative that each individual ASEAN country including Malaysia becomes sound, secure and strong from within.

The United States should assist in developing the internal defense forces of ASEAN in the standardization of military equipment and increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation among its armed forces. At the least combined exercises and the IMET program should be stepped up because of their relatively low profile and cost and the relatively high returns for all parties including the United States. Closer defense cooperation among ASEAN countries, supported by U.S. military assistance, offers the best prospect of security of ASEAN. U.S. security assistance to ASEAN countries must continue in direct relationship to U.S. interests. The United States, in concert with Japan and the Five Power Defense Arrangement countries, should provide ASEAN countries with security assistance levels which will allow them to assume greater responsibility for protecting regional sealanes of communication and early warning systems within ASEAN. The United States should reaffirm its

existing treaty commitments to its ASEAN allies while urging the ASEAN countries to seek more stable relations with PRC. ASEAN countries may have to bury their suspicions of China in order to offset the potential for Soviet sponsored aggression in the region. U.S. should also encourage the PRC to sever its policy of establishing party to party link between CCP and the communist insurgent movements in the Southeast Asian region so as to allay their apprehension towards PRC's intention in this region. In return the ASEAN states should support directly or indirectly the United States policy of maintaining forces in the Pacific.

In order to ensure a peaceful Southeast Asia environment, it is necessary to get all states of the region to accept that one state shall not interfere in the internal affairs of another. There must be mutual respect of territorial integrity and independence of all countries in the region. There should be a peaceful solution to the Kampuchean problem. There should be an Independent Vietnam and the reduction of Soviet influence in Indochina. In the long term all Southeast Asian states should adopt equidistance from all external Big Powers. The concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality should be the ultimate objective.

Malaysia with all other ASEAN states should accept the principle of Pacific settlement of disputes and conflicts to ensure a strong and effective ASEAN community. All ASEAN states must be committed to the strengthening of ASEAN as an organization.

Therefore, in terms of regional security, Malaysia's strategy should be based on three pillars. The first is the need to contribute towards a secure Southeast Asia through the means discussed above. The second is to work towards strong and effective ASEAN community by burying the many differences with individual states, strengthen her relatively new democratic institution,

achieve economic prosperity and be able to meet the aspirations of the people. The third is to work towards a sound, secure and strong nation.

INTERNAL SECURITY

The Chinese Community

Malaysia must come to term with the problem of the overseas Chinese population. The government must continue to get the support of the majority of the Chinese through peaceful and persuasive means as it had been able too do so in the past. The government must try to convince the Chinese that they would be better off to become loyal citizens of Malaysia as opposed to looking back to their original motherland--China. All grievances should be discussed by the leaders in an amicable atmosphere as opposed to airing them publicly in the news media thus widening discord and distrust. Both groups, the Chinese and the Malays must develop trust and confidence in each other. This will depend on sound, rational and patient leadership on both sides to find a temporary as well as lasting solution. The grievances should be removed or at least minimized with the spirit of give and take from all concerned. This will prevent political instability which will benefit only the communist's cause to overthrow the government.

Political Stability

The trend in communal politics will certainly continue in the future so long as political parties are based on communal lines. There is no sign that the present parties such as UMNO, MCA and MIC will abandon their present stand. It will also mean that the present arrangement of compromise, for whatever it is worth, will persist. Internal stability and security will therefore depend very much on how willing the different races in Malaysia are to set aside differences and compromise on sensitive politics.

To a very large extent the manner in which the political parties play their roles will certainly determine future stability and security of the country. When leaders of the parties realize that they cannot afford another racial clash as that of 13 May 1969, they will have to ensure that their followers i.e., Malaysians of respective races are not manipulated through sensational communal issues either by unscrupulous leaders or by the communists. The government must actively set up solidarity and goodwill committees as in the period after the bloody riot of May 1969 to gloss over racial difference, create mutual respect between races and accentuate the positive side of both the Malay and Chinese races.

Economic Stability

The Malaysian economy is currently undergoing fundamental changes. The trend points towards slow but promising growth as opposed to steady upward growth in the booming 70's. The government's 10-point Economic Program of Action (EPA) are: reducing the budget deficit mainly through cuts in spending; raising food production to reduce food imports; opening new land to resettle smallholders and promote modern small-scale farming; promoting industrialization based on a Master Plan; pushing exports; utilizing domestic excess capacity in building low cost housing and infrastructure; encouraging domestic investment through deregulations and incentives; attracting foreign investment through liberalized deregulations, tax incentives and reduced bureaucratic procedures and voluntary wage restraint in public and private sectors. Although the strategy of the 10-point EPA is impressive, its success will depend very much on its actual implementation and other factors.

For the Malaysian economy to improve further the government has to step up productivity, maintain the right emphasis and discipline and cut down

wastage. The government should ensure that all her economic development programs and returns are evenly distributed. Malaysia needs to grow enough food for her consumption and export the surplus. Industrialization is necessary to improve the country's earning power, but equally important is the ability of the administration to carefully plan and execute the right economic strategy. Economic development projects should be evenly distributed throughout the country to create equal employment opportunities. To enhance local and foreign investments, the government needs to restore the credibility of Malaysia's financial system which had undergone a bad experience lately. It also must ensure political stability.

National Unity

The government and all political leaders of the various races must address the problem of national unity and nation building in a positive manner. In this respect all races must recognize the need for a common point of reference. The one nation, one language and one culture and unity through diversity must achieve an acceptable formula. The younger generation must be molded as a cohesive entity through one common educational system that can bring about integration of the various races as experienced in multiracial countries like the United States. The price of unity should not be too high for any racial group to sacrifice.

Religious Extremism

The government has taken stern action in its effort to control the spread of religious extremism. To counter religious extremism the government must put more effort to strengthen social cohesion, unity, inter ethnic harmony and solidarity. To ensure that they are brought under control the government must

not hesitate to resort to enforce the Internal Security Act and the official Secret Act even in the face of external pressure groups such as the human rights movement. This is a lower price to pay than internal bloodshed and political instability.

Drug Abuse and Other Social Issues

The enforcement of the law must be effective to ensure that this menace is minimized and eventually eradicated. The Armed Forces must be on the lookout to ensure that its members are not afflicted by this social disease.

The government must also address the other social problems such as unemployment, economic slowdown, squatter problems and increased crime rate positively. The use of the right strategy and proper implementation to lessen those problems will eliminate dissatisfaction thus reducing the opportunities for the communist to exploit these issues for their own end.

The Communist Threat

The communist threat posed by CPM is in the form of the communist united front through subversive activities and a comparatively low-profile armed insurrection by its militant wing. The armed wing of the CPM consists of the remnants in South Thailand of about 2,000 strong. In Peninsular Malaysia the strength stands at 181 and in Sarawak remains at 46. CPM continues to promote their cause through the exploitation of all issues revolving around government policies on the political, socioeconomic and religious fronts with the objective of discrediting the government. Winning the support of the Malays remains their primary preoccupation because only with the support of the Malays who make up the majority of the population can CPM hope to achieve success in Malaysia.

The best strategy to fight the communist threat remains, as it has been in the past, for the government to provide a secure environment through the efforts of the security forces so that government machinery can function effectively towards advancement in socioeconomic development of the country. A strong, stable government is needed to solve the current political, economic and social problems faced by the country. The key factor is economic growth and economic development. As long as the economic aspirations of the people can be met and the people feel that they get a share of the benefits the threat from communism will remain dormant and will never get the support it requires. Political stability and economic prosperity will be the strongest weapons against communism. In the meantime the security forces should remain vigilant to ensure that the CPM's design to create a communist state through subversion and militant acts should never be allowed to succeed. The continued implementation of the concept of "Internal Defense and Development" should eventually provide all citizens a place in the sun and communism would then just be like a fish without water.

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